Bias Within Because of Threat From Outside: The Effects of an External Call for Terrorism on Anti-Muslim Attitudes in the United States

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Abstract
Prejudice against Muslim Americans increased after 9/11, but little is known about the extent to which anti-Muslim attitudes shift in response to external events, in particular calls for terrorism from individuals outside the United States. Motivated by the relevance of this question and guided by past research on both intergroup relations and emotion regulation, an experiment was conducted in which participants viewed a mock news video with an English voice-over of an Arabic speaker either calling for or condemning terrorism against the United States (or no video in the control condition). The terrorism provocation increased anti-Muslim bias but only for participants high in both in-group (American) glorification and revenge planning. The same three-way interaction was also found for anger toward Muslims. When glorification and revenge planning were both high, anger toward Muslims mediated the effect on bias against Muslims but mediation did not occur when the moderators were at low levels.

Keywords
anger, emotion regulation, identity, individual differences, intergroup relations, prejudice/stereotyping

Prejudice and discrimination against Muslim Americans¹ increased dramatically in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (Federal Bureau of Investigations, 2012). A recent article highlighted that there is evidence of continued anti-Muslim bias, and hate crimes against Muslim Americans are still regularly occurring though seldom reported nationally (Beinart, 2012). However, the psychological dynamics motivating these attitudes are not well understood. Most important, it is not clear whether people’s attitudes toward Muslim Americans are stable or are reactive to events, particularly when foreign agents threaten acts of terrorism. For example, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri recently called for followers of Islam to kidnap Americans (Carter, 2012). Muslim Americans have no control over such calls for terrorism, and yet we hypothesize that some non-Muslim Americans may respond to such threats with increased bias against Americans who are Muslim. The goal of our research was to understand the extent to which people’s out-group attitudes shift in response to external provocations and the characteristics of those who are most susceptible to such attitude changes.

Our research was motivated by the belief that the effect of external calls for terrorism on anti-Muslim attitudes is an issue of social importance. However, our work also had a broader goal of building a bridge between research on intergroup relations and research on emotion regulation. Intergroup relations’ researchers have previously linked bias against out-groups to multiple kinds of intergroup threats (for a meta-analytic review see Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). According to integrated threat theory, in-group identity is an antecedent to threat, and Riek, Mania, and Gaertner (2006) found correlations between identification and perceived threat, including realistic and symbolic threats (see also Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009). Research motivated by social identity theory has found links between in-group identification and in-group bias, but this evidence is mixed and may occur only under certain conditions (for a review see Brown, 2000). In addition, researchers have not yet charted all of the processes that link intergroup threats and in-group identification to bias against out-groups. Recently, Halperin, Sharvit, and Gross (2011) argued that intergroup relations research would benefit from more attention to emotion regulation processes. We reasoned that taking an emotion regulation perspective might help clarify the characteristics of people who are most susceptible to an increase in

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out-group bias when threats occur. Because bias against Muslim Americans is of such contemporary importance, we believed that examining anti-Muslim bias following an external threat of terrorism was a particularly important context in which to investigate these general processes.

In developing our research, the first issue we considered was how to conceptualize out-group bias. The existing research on bias against Muslim Americans has largely been conducted after 9/11, examining a wide array of policies (e.g., support for military action, de Zavala & Kossowska, 2011; Lambert et al., 2010) and attitudes (e.g., anti-Arab sentiment and discrimination, Oswald, 2005; Pratto & Glasford, 2008). Other research considered the idea that beliefs about Muslims can extend to views of Islam as a religion (Echebarria-Echabe & Guedes, 2007). Based on this past work, our conception of out-group bias included attitudes (anti-Arab sentiment), beliefs (Islam promotes war; Muslims are not “true” Americans; collective blame of Muslims), and discrimination (support for deportation). We also believed it was important to examine emotional reactions to threat. Thus, we also assessed group-directed anger toward Muslims, and we hypothesized that it would mediate changes in the level of out-group bias caused by the manipulation of threat.

**Group Identification as a Moderator of People’s Responses to Provocations**

After determining which measures of anti-Muslim bias to include in our research, we developed our hypotheses about what variables would moderate the extent to which exposure to an external call for terrorism would affect anti-Muslim bias and anger toward Muslims. We hypothesized that exposure to a terrorist threat would increase negative attitudes toward Muslims, but we also hypothesized that this shift was most likely to occur for a subset of susceptible perceivers. Intergroup relations’ research has suggested that highly identified individuals are the most affected by intergroup provocations. For example, Brown, Wohl, and Exline (2008) found that American identification was positively correlated with anger after 9/11. Stenstrom, Lickel, Denson, and Miller (2008) found that identification with one’s political party was positively correlated with anger and retaliation against the other party after a provocation.

In addition to moderation of threat by the strength of identification, the subtype of group identification may matter (Roccas, Klar, & Livian, 2006; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, Heley, & Eidelson, 2008), and some forms of identification may be more likely to moderate responses to provocations than others. For example, Roccas et al. (2006) found that glorification (thinking one’s group is superior and deferring to group leaders) was negatively associated with guilt for in-group transgressions, whereas attachment (thinking that one’s group identity is important and feeling committed to the group) was positively associated with guilt. Therefore, we examined the moderating effect of glorification, the form of in-group identification most closely related to negative out-group attitudes.

**Emotions and Emotion Regulation**

Although the prior research indicates the importance of identification, we believe that there is danger in only examining the role of identification in moderating people’s responses to threats. In particular, people’s chronic emotion regulation tendencies may play a role in shaping the extent to which glorification moderates response to intergroup threat. The field of emotion regulation research (Gross, 1998) has focused on understanding the different ways in which people process personal or interpersonal emotion-eliciting events, including examining people’s chronic emotion regulation styles. Gross, Halperin, and colleagues (Gross, Halperin, & Porat, 2013; Halperin, Sharvit, & Gross, 2011) recently discussed how emotion regulation processes can play a role in intergroup conflicts. As they highlighted, very little empirical research has been conducted from this perspective (for a review see Gross et al., 2013).

In one example of this kind of research, Halperin and Gross (2011) measured individual differences in reappraisal during the 2009 conflict in Gaza and found that reappraisal was positively associated with willingness among Jewish Israelis to provide humanitarian aid to Gaza (see also Halperin, Pliskin, Saguy, Liberman, & Gross, 2013; Halperin, Porat, Tamir, & Gross, 2013). Our work extends their ideas by examining a different emotion regulation variable (rumination about revenge) and by experimentally manipulating an intergroup threat rather than examining emotion regulation processes in the context of ongoing conflict.

We hypothesized that individual differences in the tendency to engage in rumination would be particularly important in the context of intergroup provocations. Rumination is the tendency to repetitively direct attention to and elaborate upon emotion-eliciting events (Just & Alloy, 1997). In response to anger-eliciting interpersonal provocations, research on rumination has shown that it predicts interpersonal aggression (Bushman, 2002) and can lead to intrusive thoughts of revenge (Denson, 2013). Research has also shown that people have stable individual differences in their propensity to ruminate about revenge after interpersonal provocations and these differences predict responses to interpersonal provocations (Denson, 2009; Denson, Pedersen, & Miller, 2006). We hypothesized that people’s chronic tendency to ruminate about revenge (i.e., revenge planning; Denson et al., 2006) would also moderate responses to intergroup provocations. To our knowledge, ours is the first research to test this effect. Because past research illustrates the importance of identification and because we believe revenge planning plays an important role, our research was designed to test the manner in which individual differences in identification and revenge planning jointly moderate changes in anti-Muslim bias and anger toward Muslims after experimental exposure to a call for terrorism.

We were also interested in examining the previously established link between out-group-directed emotions, anger in particular, and beliefs and attitudes toward the target of those emotions. In past research, anger in response to the 9/11 attacks was correlated with acceptance of hate crimes against Muslim
Americans and support for increased surveillance (Sadler, Lineberger, Correll, & Park, 2005). Thus, we predicted that anger toward Muslims would explain the effect on beliefs about Muslims. That is, the effect of the provocation manipulation on anti-Muslim bias will be moderated by identification and emotion regulation tendencies and be mediated by anger toward Muslims.

**Current Research**

We hypothesized that exposure to an intergroup threat will increase anger and bias toward an out-group but that the effect of this threat will be jointly moderated by in-group identification and revenge planning. To test this hypothesis, we manipulated the threat of terrorism by presenting participants with a video of a foreign Islamic cleric who either advocated for anti-American terrorism or condemned it. We also included a no-video control condition for which we hypothesized responses similar to the antiterrorism video condition. Our measurement of individual differences in revenge planning was drawn from an established scale (i.e., Revenge Planning Subscale of the Displaced Aggression Questionnaire; Denson et al., 2006). We assessed American identification by measuring in-group glorification, a form of identification that stresses in-group superiority and deference to leaders and that has been implicated in negative intergroup responses (Roccas et al., 2006). Past research has shown that individual differences in political orientation (i.e. conservatism) tend to be related to out-group bias (Ray & Furnham, 1984); furthermore, glorification itself may be related to political ideology. Because we wanted to isolate the effect of glorification on anti-Muslim bias, we controlled for political orientation in our analyses.

We hypothesized that people high in the chronic tendency to engage in revenge planning in interpersonal situations would also show an elevated response to the group-based terrorism provocation, but this would be strongest for those participants who were also high in glorification. We hypothesized that people low in either revenge planning or glorification would show a muted response to the proterrorism provocation. A challenge to group identity might not motivate anti-Muslim bias unless people are ruminating about revenge. Similarly, those high in revenge planning might not be motivated to defend their group unless they are highly identified. Thus, we hypothesized a three-way interaction such that the terrorism provocation (compared to the antiterrorism and no video control conditions) would increase anti-Muslim bias, but this effect would be the strongest only for those jointly high in both revenge planning and glorification. We also hypothesized that anger toward Muslims would mediate the effect of the provocation on anti-Muslim bias but only when both glorification and revenge planning were at high levels.

**Method**

**Participants and Design**

Ninety-six undergraduate students (\(M_{\text{age}} = 20.01\); 87 females; 74 Whites, 9 multicultural, 7 Asians, 5 Blacks, and 1 Hispanic) who identified as U.S. citizens but not as Muslim, Arab, or an Arabic speaker participated in a three-condition experiment (high provocation, low provocation, and a control condition).

**Procedure**

Individual differences in glorification, attachment, revenge planning, and political orientation were measured in an online assessment at least 1 week prior to the laboratory experiment. In the laboratory, participants were randomly assigned to the proterrorism high provocation, antiterrorism low provocation, or a no-video control condition. In the high-provocation and low-provocation conditions, participants watched a 30-s video and completed the dependent measures. In the no-video control condition, participants were told that they would watch a video after answering some questions (to be consistent with the consent in the other conditions), but after completing the dependent measures, they were informed that there would be no video. The instructions to the questionnaire in all conditions framed the questions as being about people’s opinions of “Arab Americans and the religion of Islam.” In the two-video conditions, both videos were the same visually with an impassioned Imam in traditional clothes, and both contained the same Arabic soundtrack taken from the original video clip (which was unrelated to terrorism but which increased in its emotional tone over the course of the video). The participants were led to believe they were watching an actual news clip with an English translation. Thus, the Arabic was at reduced volume, and the English voice-over played louder. The English voice-over presented a parallel message in both video conditions, priming the topic of terrorist acts against the United States. However, in the high-provocation video, the English voice-over expressed support for terrorist acts and encouraged other Muslims to carry out such actions. In the low-provocation video, the message condemned terrorist acts and discouraged Muslims from committing those actions. The video only showed the Imam, but it was implied by the message and his position at a podium that he was speaking to an audience. All participants were fully debriefed at the end of the study.

**Measures**

At Time 1, \(\gamma = .86\); Roccas et al., 2008), for example, “America is better than other nations in all respects,” attachment \(\gamma = .91\); Roccas et al., 2008), for example, “Belonging to America is an important part of my identity,” revenge planning \(\gamma = .93\); Denson et al., 2006), for example, “When someone makes me angry I can’t stop thinking about how to get back at this person,” and political orientation (liberal vs. conservative and Democrat vs. Republican, \(r = .48, p < .001\)) were measured. At Time 2, bias measures included anti-Arab sentiment \(\gamma = .87\); Pratto & Glasford, 2008), support for deportation of Muslims \(\gamma = .90\); Skitka, Bauman, Aramovich, & Morgan, 2006), the belief that Islam promotes war \(\gamma = .81\); adapted from Echebarria-Echabe & Guede, 2007), the belief that Muslims are not American \(\gamma = .84\); adapted from
Yogeeswaran & Dasgupta, 2010), and collective blame of Muslims in response to terrorist acts (\(\alpha = .85\); adapted from Lickel, Schmader, & Hamilton, 2003).\(^4\) Target-specific anger was also measured (anger at Muslims, Arabs, and Middle Easterners; \(\alpha = .98\)).

**Results**

We report our analyses of the study in four steps. We first conducted a confirmatory factor analysis on the individual bias measures to justify making one composite measure of anti-Muslim bias to simplify the following analyses. Next, we tested the simple effect of the experimental manipulation and conducted comparisons between the experimental conditions. We then examined the extent to which glorification and revenge planning moderated the effect of the provocation manipulation on anti-Muslim bias. Finally, we conducted moderated mediation analyses to test whether anger mediated the effect of manipulation on bias at the predicted levels of glorification and revenge planning (i.e., high, high) but not at other levels.

**Confirmatory Factor Analysis**

We hypothesized that different aspects of anti-Muslim bias all stemmed from one underlying latent variable. Therefore, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis to test the extent to which anti-Arab sentiment, support for deportation, the belief that Islam promotes war, the belief that Muslims are not American, and collective blame of Muslims loaded onto one factor. The model was estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. The model fit was acceptable, \(\chi^2(5) = 7.43, p = .19\), root mean square error of approximation = .078, normed fit index = .979, comparative fit index = .993, standardized root mean square residual = .031. The factor loadings of each indicator were also acceptable, \(r = .68–.90\). The results of the confirmatory factor analysis justified collapsing the five indicators of bias into one composite measure (for the means, standard deviations [SDs], and correlations of the individual subscales see Table 1). The remaining analyses examined this general measure of bias against Muslims (the composite variable, \(\alpha = .88\)) and anger toward Muslims (\(\alpha = .97\)), which were correlated, \(r = .60, p < .001\).

**Simple Effects of the Provocation Manipulation**

Before conducting the analyses examining the extent to which glorification and revenge planning moderate the effect of the manipulation, we report the simple (unmoderated) effect of the manipulation. To test this, we conducted separate one-way analysis of covariances on anti-Muslim bias and anger toward Muslims, controlling for political orientation.\(^5\) There was a significant effect of the provocation manipulation on anti-Muslim bias, \(F(2, 92) = 6.96, p = .002, \eta_p^2 = .132\), and on anger toward Muslims, \(F(2, 92) = 11.23, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .196\). Participants responded with more bias in the high-provocation (adjusted \(M = 3.26\), standard error \([SE = .15]\) versus the low-provocation conditions (adjusted \(M = 2.51, SE = .14\)), \(t(92) = 2.51, p = .014, d = 0.94\). More bias was reported in the high-provocation than in the control condition (adjusted \(M = 2.74, SE = .14\)), \(t(92) = 3.69, p < .001, d = 0.64\). Bias did not differ between the low-provocation and control conditions, \(t(92) = 1.21, p = .230, d = −0.30\). Political conservatism was a significant predictor of bias in addition to the experimental effect, \(F(1, 92) = 14.69, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .138\). Participants responded with more anger toward Muslims in the high-provocation (adjusted \(M = 2.66, SE = .22\)) compared to the low-provocation conditions (adjusted \(M = 1.60, SE = .20\)), \(t(92) = 3.54, p = .001, d = 0.90\). Participants also reported more anger in the high-provocation versus the control conditions (adjusted \(M = 1.28, SE = .21\)), \(t(92) = 4.57, p < .001, d = 1.18\). Anger toward Muslims did not differ between the low-provocation and control conditions, \(t(92) = 1.13, p = .263, d = 0.28\). Political conservatism did not significantly predict anger toward Muslims, \(F(1, 92) = 3.07, p = .083, \eta_p^2 = .032\).

**Experimental Effects Moderated by Glorification and Revenge Planning**

We predicted and found that the high-provocation condition resulted in increased bias against and anger toward Muslims. However, we expected people who were high in both glorification and revenge planning to have the strongest responses.\(^6\) To examine this, we conducted a series of moderated multiple regression analyses. We hypothesized that there would be a different pattern of results in the provocation condition compared to the control and the no provocation conditions, which we expected to show similar moderation patterns. Following the procedures recommended by Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003), the conditions were contrast coded to compare the provocation condition (coded as 1) against the average of the no provocation (coded as −0.5) and control conditions (coded as −0.5). As required to properly conduct these analyses, a second contrast code compared the no provocation (coded as 1) to the

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**Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for the Bias Against Muslims Subscales.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subscale</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Anti-Arab sentiment</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Support for deportation</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>.633***</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Islam promotes war</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>.772***</td>
<td>.530***</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Muslims are not Americans</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>.699***</td>
<td>.506***</td>
<td>.719***</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Collective blame</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>.628***</td>
<td>.554***</td>
<td>.550***</td>
<td>.536***</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*\(p < .05\), **\(p < .01\), ***\(p < .001\).*
control condition (coded as \(-1\)), excluding the provocation condition (coded as 0). In addition to these effects, all possible two-way and three-way interaction terms with glorification and revenge planning were included in the model, controlling for attachment and political orientation.\(^7\)

We first examined general bias against Muslims (see Figure 1). As predicted, the three-way interaction was significant, \(b = 0.43, \text{SE} = 0.16, p = .008, \Delta R^2 = .029\). To more specifically test the hypothesis that anti-Muslim bias was elevated for those in the provocation condition who were high in both glorification and revenge planning, we conducted a series of follow-up tests. We rescaled glorification and revenge planning to set the value of 0 at high and low values (i.e., \(\pm 1.00 \text{ SD above and below the mean}\)). As predicted, when glorification and revenge planning were both high, participants presented with a threat of terrorism (\(M = 4.44\)) reported significantly higher anti-Muslim bias than the other conditions (\(M = 2.91\), low provocation; \(M = 3.25\), \(b = 0.96, \text{SE} = 0.31, p = .003\).

Moreover, when either revenge planning or glorification was set at a low value (and the other at a high value), the differences were also not significant, \(rs < 1\). Thus, general bias against Muslims was elevated after a threat of terrorism was presented, but this effect was seen among participants for whom glorification and revenge planning were jointly high. However, we found an unexpected result that when glorification and revenge planning were both low, there was a significant difference in anti-Muslim bias between the provocation condition (\(M = 3.25\)) and the average of the other two conditions (\(M = 2.20\), low provocation; \(M = 2.21\), control), \(b = 0.72, \text{SE} = 0.25, p = .005\).

Testing Anger as a Mediator: Moderated Mediation Analyses

In the previous section, we outlined the three-way interaction for anti-Muslim bias. Bias was strongest when both glorification and revenge planning were at high levels but only for participants who watched the proterrorism video. Based on past research on intergroup emotions, we only expected anger toward Muslims to mediate the effect of the manipulation at certain levels of glorification and revenge planning (i.e., high, high). Thus, we conducted a moderated mediation analysis testing anger toward Muslims as a mediator of the effect of the provocation manipulation on anti-Muslim bias. Using PROCESS (Hayes, 2013), we tested whether the difference between the provocation condition and the average of the other two conditions was mediated by anger toward different levels of revenge planning and glorification (see Figure 2). As in the earlier moderation analyses, these regression analyses also controlled for the second contrast code, all other interactions with this coded variable, attachment, and conservatism. We predicted that anger would significantly mediate the effect when both glorification and revenge planning were high but not when either or both were low. As can be seen in Figure 3, the predicted three-way interaction for anger toward Muslims was significant, \(b = 0.59, \text{SE} = 0.23, p = .013, \Delta R^2 = .033\) (path a in Figure 2),\(^8\) meaning that the effect of the manipulation on anger toward Muslims was jointly moderated by glorification and revenge planning. Furthermore, there was a significant

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Figure 1. Three-way interaction between condition, glorification, and revenge planning predicting general bias against Muslims.

Figure 2. Moderated mediation model.
association between anger toward Muslims and anti-Muslim bias, \( b = 0.30, SE = 0.07, p < .001 \) (path b in Figure 2), accounting for all possible simple and interaction effects on paths a and c. According to the method outlined by Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes (2007), confidence intervals (CIs) to test the significance of the mediation model were computed at high and low levels of the moderators using bias-corrected bootstrapping with 50,000 resamples. As predicted, anger significantly mediated the effect of the provocation when glorification and revenge planning were at high levels, 95% CI [0.33, 1.51]. Also, as predicted, bootstrapping conducted at other levels of glorification and revenge planning showed no evidence of mediation. Mediation did not occur when glorification was low and revenge planning was high, 95% CI [−0.44, 0.39], or when glorification was high and revenge planning was low, 95% CI [−0.10, 0.48]. This final finding is particularly important because as reported earlier in the analyses of anti-Muslim bias, there was an unexpected difference in the bias measure between the provocation condition and the average of the other two conditions when both glorification and revenge planning were at low levels. The moderated mediation analyses indicate that this unexpected difference was not related to out-group-directed anger.

**Discussion**

This study advances our understanding of how people respond to out-group threats such as calls for terrorism from groups like al-Qaeda. First, it provides the clearest experimental evidence to date that viewing a vivid threat of terrorism from a Muslim leader does at least temporarily affect people’s beliefs and attitudes toward Muslims in general. Second, the research provides the first evidence about how individual differences in the way in which people respond to provocations (i.e., revenge planning) operate in tandem with in-group identification (i.e., glorification) to moderate people’s responses to intergroup threats. As Halperin et al. (2011) highlighted, research on intergroup conflict has largely been separate from research on emotion regulation. The few studies that have been conducted on emotion regulation in the context of intergroup conflict thus far examine the role of cognitive reappraisal in the Palestinian/Israel conflict (Gross et al., 2013). The current study contributes to this emerging area of research by examining another relevant emotion regulation construct (i.e., revenge planning) while manipulating intergroup threat, specifically the threat of terrorism in the United States. Future research on intergroup conflict should continue to integrate emotion regulation and intergroup conflict and to better understand how these processes can be turned toward conflict reduction as well as conflict amplification.

**Declaration of Conflicting Interests**

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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**Notes**

1. In our research, our measures of bias include items referring to Muslims, Arabs, and people of Middle Eastern background in the United States. For conciseness, we used the term Muslim Americans.

2. We also included scales for collective narcissism (de Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson, & Jayawickreme, 2009), suppression, reappraisal (Gross & John, 2003), life satisfaction (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985), individual narcissism (Ames, Rose, & Anderson, 2006), moral foundations (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009), self-transcendence (Park, Edmondson, Fenster, & Blank, 2008), anger rumination (Denson et al., 2006), reflection, and rumination (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999).
3. Revenge planning, anger rumination, and rumination are related constructs, and these measures were correlated (revenge planning and rumination, $r = .38$, $p < .001$, revenge planning and anger rumination, $r = .51$, $p < .001$, and rumination and anger rumination, $r = .66$, $p < .001$).

4. We also assessed anger toward al Qaeda and terrorists, general anger, fear, and positive emotions (for which we expected different patterns) and acceptance of hate crimes (Sadler et al., 2005), which was unreliable, $\alpha = .33$.

5. When we did not control for political conservatism, there was still a significant effect of anti-Muslim bias, $F(2, 93) = 4.52$, $p = .013$, $\eta_p^2 = .089$. Participants reported more bias in the high-provocation ($M = 3.19$, standard error $[SE] = 0.16$) compared to the low-provocation condition ($M = 2.53$, $SE = 0.15$), $t(93) = 3.00$, $p = .004$, $d = 0.78$. Bias was marginally higher in the provocation condition versus the no-video control ($M = 2.78$, $SE = 0.15$), $t(93) = 1.99$, $p = .071$, $d = 0.46$. The low-provocation and control conditions did not differ, $t(93) = 1.19$, $p = .234$, $d = -0.29$. There was a significant effect of the provocation manipulation on anger toward Muslims without controlling for conservatism, $F(2, 93) = 9.98$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .177$. Anger was higher in response to the high ($M = 2.61$, $SE = 0.22$) versus the low provocation ($M = 1.62$, $SE = 0.20$), $t(93) = 3.30$, $p = .001$, $d = 0.83$. People reported more anger in the provocation compared to the control condition ($M = 1.30$, $SE = 0.21$), $t(93) = 4.31$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.10$. The low-provocation and control conditions did not differ in the level of reported anger toward Muslims, $t(93) = 1.08$, $p = .282$, $d = 0.26$.

6. No prior research had examined the correlation between glorification and revenge planning, and we found that these variables were unrelated, $r = .06$, $p = .533$.

7. We also assessed in-group attachment and found that it was correlated with glorification, $r = .66$, $p < .001$. All the analyses were run controlling for in-group attachment since prior research differentiates glorification and attachment (Roccas et al., 2006). All analyses were rerun with a general identification composite, and the same three-way interaction pattern was found, but it was weaker for anti-Muslim bias, $b = 0.25$, $SE = 0.12$, $p = .044$, $\Delta R^2 = .025$. However, the three-way interaction was not significant for anger toward Muslims, $b = 0.27$, $SE = 0.18$, $p = .139$, $\Delta R^2 = .015$, indicating that there is something unique about glorification free of attachment that predicts anger.

8. The three-way interaction between the provocation, glorification, and rumination significantly predicted anger toward Muslims, $b = 0.61$, $SE = 0.25$, $p = .015$, $\Delta R^2 = .046$. No other interactions were found when revenge planning was substituted with either rumination or anger rumination.

References


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